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CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972-Federal Employee is Entitled to Trial De Novo on
Employment Discrimination Claim and Not Merely Judicial
Review of Agency Record. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108
(D.C. Cir. 1975).
Ralph Hackley, a black, was employed as an investigator within
the Veteran Administration's Investigation and Security Service
Division.' He had served for one year at the GS-12 level when he was
denied promotion.2 Hackley complained that this denial was based
solely upon his race. 3 The charge was investigated and he was afforded a hearing before a complaints examiner,4 who ruled that
1. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 111.
4. Id. at 113-14. The initial step in the complaint process on the agency level is a conference with an Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor. The counselor's job is to inquire
into the facts surrounding the employee's allegation of discrimination and attempt to reconcile the matter informally. If the controversy cannot be resolved on this level, the counselor
will accept a formal complaint from the aggrieved employee, at which time he forwards the
complaint and a report of his counseling of the employee to the agency's Equal Employment
Opportunity Officer and furnishes the employee with a copy of the report. The counselor
must, if practicable, hold his final interview with the employee within three weeks of the time
the employee first directed the matter to the counselor. If this time limit is not met and the
complaint has not been settled to the satisfaction of the complainant the counselor must
inform him of his right to file a formal complaint within fifteen days of the final interview.
A formal complaint submitted to the agency must be in writing and signed by the complainant. A complaint need be accepted for filing only where the facts upon which the
complaint is based were called to the attention of the Equal Employment Opportunity Counselor within thirty days of their occurrence and the complaint must be submitted within
fifteen days of the employee's final interview with the counselor. The agency has broad
discretion to waive compliance with these time limits. Upon agency rejection of a complaint
for any reason the employee must be notified.
The agency's Director of Equal Employment Opportunity is charged with the responsibility
of initiating an investigation of the complaint promptly. Upon completion of the investigation
the employee is given an opportunity to examine and discuss the investigative file. At this
time a further opportunity to reject or withdraw the complaint is afforded. Upon failure to
arrive at an agreeable adjustment the complainant is notified of its proposed disposition and
his right to a decision with or without a hearing.
Where the complainant does not request a hearing within fifteen days of receipt of notice
of proposed disposition the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer may adopt the proposed
disposition. The complainant must be so notified. Where a hearing is held, it is run by the
complaints examiner, who transmits his findings, analysis, and recommendations to the head
of the agency upon completion.
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there had been no discrimination.' This finding was adopted by the
Veteran's Administration.' Upon appeal, the Board of Appeals and
Review of the Civil Service Commission affirmed.'
Having thus exhausted his administrative remedies, plaintiff
commenced a civil action in the District Court for the District of
Columbia pursuant to section 717(c) of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (EEOA).1 He sought injunctive relief, retroactive promotion, and back pay, plus a declaratory judgment to the
effect that he was to be free from discrimination.' The district court,
in Hackley v. Johnson (Hackley 1),'1 granted the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that it only had jurisdiction to
consider whether Hackley had been afforded administrative due
process before the Civil Service Commission" and that he had, in
fact, received due process during the administrative hearing. 2
In Hackley v. Roudebush (Hackley II),'" the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, remanding Hackley's
claim of discrimination for trial, concluding, inter alia, that section
717(c)'s grant of a private right of action requires the district court
to conduct a trial de novo in civil actions filed under the section.' 4
In so ruling, the court fell into line with several other jurisdictions
which had held that the vindication of a federal employee's rights
under EEOA required more than mere review of the administrative
record."
Appeal from an agency disposition of a discrimination complaint lies to the Board of
Appeals and Review of the Civil Service Commission. Such appeal must be taken within
fifteen days of receipt of notice of the agency's decision. On appeal to the Civil Service
Commission there is no hearing as of right and the Commission may remand a complaint for
rehearing or further investigation. The Board of Appeals and Review is required to render a
written decision embodying reasons and forward the decision to the complainant, his representative, if any, and the agency. Upon a proper showing, the Commission has discretionary
power to reopen any decision. 5 C.F.R. §§ 713.214-218 (1974).
5. 520 F.2d at 113.
6. Id. at 114.
7. Id. at 115.
8. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §2000e-16 (Supp. III, 1973).
9. 520 F.2d at 112 n.2.
10. 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd sub nom., Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d
108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
11. Id. at 1252.
12. Id. at 1254.
13. 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
14. Id. at 112.
15. See text accompanying notes 103-12 infra.
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Writing for the court, Judge Wright argued that the construction
and legislative history of EEOA, which amended Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,16 mandated that federal employees be
granted the same right to a trial on the merits as had private sector
employees. 7 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discriminatory
employment practices based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Until the 1972 enactment of EEOA, however, its
protections did not extend to the federal employee.' 9
While the private sector employee had always enjoyed the right
to a trial de novo following investigation by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and issuance of the requisite
right-to-sue notice,2" the federal employee's suit was often tripped
up by the twin hurdles of sovereign immunity and failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.'
It was Judge Wright's opinion that the EEOA reflects Congress'
intent to eliminate these obstacles,22 and that this intent could not
be effectuated without the trial de novo remedy. 2
Section 717(d) of Title VII provides that the enforcement procedures available to the private sector shall govern an action brought
by the federal employee.24 On its face, the district court observed,2 5
it appears that the trial de novo would be extended to federal employees under this section. The defendants, however, had relied
upon the district court's interpretation" of section 717(d) as only
requiring private sector protections "where applicable." Their argument followed that where an administrative record was extant,
those protections were not applicable. The court of appeals rejected
16. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 717, 86 Stat. 103
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. II1, 1973)).
17. 520 F.2d at 118-35.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
19. Id. § 2000e(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
20. Prior to 1972, if EEOC failed to achieve voluntary compliance, the agency would
notify the complainant, who then had thirty days to bring suit in federal district court. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973). Since 1972, of course, the EEOC
has power to bring suit on its own. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (Supp. III, 1973), amending 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
21. 520 F.2d at 116.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 117.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (Supp. III, 1973).
25. 520 F.2d at 119-20.
26. 360 F. Supp. at 1252 n.9.
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this construction, ruling that the "as applicable" language was
merely included for clarification purposes." Section 717(d) applies
sections 706(f) through (k)2" to actions brought by federal employees. These sections, in addition to outlining a private individual's
right to sue, also deal with civil actions brought by the EEOC and
the Attorney General."5 These sections, the court of appeals pointed
out,3" will only apply to the federal employee's suit "where applicable," and it is the court's opinion that the language in question was
meant to encompass exactly that situation.' It went on to observe
that if Congress had intended to limit the district court's function
to a review of the administrative record, it would have said so in so
many words, rather than relying upon the somewhat ambiguous
"where applicable" language of section 717(d).32 Were Hackley I's
view to be followed, the court would have the power to choose which
private sector protections would be available to a particular federal
employee. 3 The court of appeals thus firmly rejects such an interpretation.
Having disposed of this question of construction, Hackley II proceeded to examine the legislative history of EEOA,3 ' finding that,
despite occasional obscurities, it clearly reflected a congressional
intent to grant the federal employee a trial de novo.33 In extending
27. 520 F.2d at 119-20.
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f) to (k) (Supp. III, 1973).
29. The EEOC has thirty days following the filing of the initial charge or the end of the
state deferral period in which to bring a civil suit. If the defendant in such a suit is a
"government, governmental agency, or political subdivision," the EEOC must refer it to the
U.S. Attorney General. In both instances, suit may only be brought if efforts at conciliation
have failed. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Prior to the enactment of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, the EEOC had no such enforcement power. Judge Wright noted that, before 1972,
"the EEOC acted essentially as a conciliatory agency in seeking voluntary and informal
methods of dispute resolution." 520 F.2d at 122 n.57.
30. 520 F.2d at 119-20.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id. The district court saw § 717(d) as providing the courts with a wide degree of
discretion. According to the court its task is "to examine the administrative record with
utmost care. If it determines that an absence of discrimination is affirmatively established
by the clear weight of the evidence in the record, no new trial is required. If this exacting
standard is not met, the Court shall, in its discretion, as appropriate, remand, take testimony
to supplement the administrative record, or grant the plaintiff relief on the administrative
record." 360 F. Supp. at 1252.
34. 520 F.2d at 122-35.
35. Id. at 122.
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protection to federal employees, the court of appeals noted,36 Congress was providing for a full airing of the merits of a particular case,
rather than mere review of the administrative record. The court
buttressed this conclusion by stating that the provisions of the bill
that governed the private sector employee's trial de novo, rather
than the provisions governing the suits reviewing cease and desist
orders, were to control the federal employee's suit.37
The EEOA had its origins in the "Hawkins Bill,"3 which was
designed to provide the EEOC with the power to issue cease and
desist orders against discriminatory employment practices in the
private sector. Under the bill, such an order would be open to limited review in the federal court of appeals,39 where the standard of
review would be "substantial evidence on the record considered as
a whole." 40 Significantly, the right of the private sector employee to
file a civil suit, which the courts had ruled to be a trial de novo, was
retained."
After much debate on the floor of the House, the "Erlenborn
Bill"42 was adopted, which withheld cease and desist authority from
the EEOC, 3 and instead gave EEOC power to file a civil suit in the
district court. At the same time, however, the new bill excepted
federal employees from the protection of Title VII."
Similar legislation had also been proposed in the Senate, 5 and
again the attempt was made to give the EEOC cease and desist
authority.4" More importantly, the bill protected the federal em36.
37.

Id. at 124.
Id. at 123.
38. H.R. 1746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON LABOR AND
PuBuc WELFARE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR-

TUNITY ACT OF 1972, 32-60 (Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
39. 520 F.2d at 123.
40. Id. The preponderance of the evidence standard and the substantial evidence test are
not coextensive and could not be used interchangeably. The former can only be used in
circumstances where there is a trier of fact. The substantial evidence test, however, can only
have application in circumstances where a court is reviewing the actions of another factfinder,
and restricting itself to the reviewing function. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 525 (3d ed.
1972).
41. 520 F.2d at 123.
42. H.R. 9247, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 141-47.
43. 520 F.2d at 126.
44. Id.

45.

S.2515, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971),

46.

520 F.2d at 126.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

157-87.
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ployee, who would, according to its terms, receive the benefit of the
provisions governing the private sector.47 The court of appeals attached great weight to the House and Senate Reports" accompanying the respective bills out of committee. Each had stressed the
congressional resolve that the private sector trial provisions, rather
than the "substantial evidence" provisions governing the appeal of
cease and desist orders, should apply to the federal employee's
suit. 9 Eventually, the move to give the EEOC cease and desist
authority went down to defeat, when the Senate adopted an amendment proposed by Senator Dominick denying such authority.5 °
Dominick argued that the bill limited the private sector employee
to the "'substantial evidence' Court of Appeals review of final
EEOC orders" while entitling the federal employee to a trial de
novo.' The purpose of the amendment therefore was to put both
types of employees on equal footing. 2 The adoption of the Dominick
amendment reinforced the court of appeal's conviction that the federal employee is entitled to trial on the merits. 3
Senator Dominick was also largely responsible for reserving a role
for the Civil Service Commission (CSC) in Title VII complaints. 4
Prior to the 1972 Act, investigation and hearings were conducted by
the CSC upon receipt of a complaint of discrimination.5 5 The reports
of both houses express congressional dissatisfaction with the manner in which CSC had handled its job." This dissatisfaction led to
the sentiment that Title VII protections ought to be extended to the
federal employee. 7 Dominick's revisions of the original bill provided
that CSC would still have a certain amount of authority over complaints of discrimination," coexisting with the federal employee's
new right to sue in the federal court.
47. Id.
48. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT];
S. REp. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
49. HOUSE REPORT 22; SENATE REPORT 12-13.
50. 520 F.2d at 131.
51. Id. at 129-30.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See 5 C.F.R. § 713 (1972).
56. 520 F.2d at 136. Problems with CSC procedure were exposed by the fact that the
CSC's Board of Appeals and Review seldom reversed an agency determination. Id.
57. Id. at 124.
58. Id. at 129-30.
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Judge Wright focused his attention upon Hackley I's analysis of
the legislative history of the 197251 amendments and found it wanting.6 The lower court had relied heavily upon the comments of
Senator Williams, who had frequently referred to the federal employee's right as being merely a "review of the administrative proceeding . . ... 1 Hackley 1I attached minimum weight to these
remarks, which it considered to be inconsistent with the general
trend of debate, and noted that the district court had completely
62
omitted discussion of Senator Dominick's revealing comments.
The court noted that Senator Williams himself had, in fact, acknowledged that Senator Dominick could speak with more authority than he on the federal employee provisions. 3
The court also questioned Hackley I's argument that Congress'
tightening of Civil Service Commission review procedures reflected
its belief that that agency should retain primary responsibility for
59. Id. at 134-48.
60. Id.at 135.
61. 360 F. Supp. at 1252 (D.D.C. 1973).
62. 520 F.2d at 147.
63. Id. Senator Cranston also addressed himself to the trial de novo issue, but an apparent
error in transcription has lessened the precedential value of his remarks. His comments, as
originally reported, read as follows:
For the first time, [it will] permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government
in discrimination cases-under the theory of Federal sovereign immunity, courts have
not generally allowed such suits-and to bring suit either prior to or after CSC review
of the agency EEO decision in the case. As with other cases brought under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Federal district court review would be based on the
agency and/or CSC record and would not be a trial de novo.
118 CONG. REC. 2287 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1972), LEGIsLATIvE HISTORY 174. Senator Cranston
later claimed that he had been misquoted, and accordingly corrected the reprint of his
remarks so as to call for a trial de novo:
As with other cases brought under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Federal
district court review would not be based on the agency and/or CSC record and would
be a trial de novo.
118 Cong. Rec. 4929 (1972). This corrected version of the statement appears in the final bound
volume of the Record in its appropriate place in the final Senate debate on February 22, 1972.
In any event, Judge Wright argued that even if the court were to hold Senator Cranston to
his remarks as originally reported, they would carry little weight as they would then include
a misstatement of the law. The court pointed to the words, "[als with other cases brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," which prefaced Cranston's conclusion that
no trial de novo was accorded federal employees. Of course, this would be incorrect if allowed
to stand, for the private sector employee had a right to trial de novo at the time. 520 F.2d at
147-48. See also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See generally 24 Cath. U. L. Rev. 126 (1974); 24 Drake
L. Rev. 236 (1974).
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Title VII complaints." Both the House 5 and Senate Reports" had
made note of the problems accompanying such an arrangement.
The lower court had attached great weight to these changes. 7 Judge
Wright attached very little, 8 saying "no substantial reform "' 9 had
been effected. The same defects that had been exposed in the Reports still exist,70 and for that reason the CSC cannot be given the
extent of power afforded it by the district court.
The court of appeals found no compelling policy reasons for limiting the federal employee's rights in federal court.7 ' A trial de novo
need not result in mere duplication of the administrative record.7"
In court, the employee has the right to compel testimony,73 in addition to the other discovery weapons he has at his disposal.7 4 Such
cases, opined the court, would supplement the administrative record, rather than duplicate it." As to the standard "flood gates"
argument, i.e., that allowing a trial de novo in every case would
inundate the court, it noted that the courts would be forced to
examine the administrative record anyway,7" so that additional live
testimony would not be too time consuming. Certainly, the court
observed, the concern of Congress was more with the elimination of
discriminatory employment practices than with the conservation of
judicial resources.
The district court had argued that the CSC had acquired unique
expertise in the process of reviewing claims, and that, wherever
possible, the courts should defer to that expertise.77 In answer, the
court of appeals pointed to section 717(c), which gives the employee
the right to actually bypass the Commission and go straight to court
after a final agency determination. Thus, the agency's complaint
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

520 F.2d at 139-42.
HOUSE REPORT 23, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 83.
SENATE REPORT 16, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 425.
360 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
520 F.2d at 137-38.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 147-56.
Id.at 150-52.
Id.at 151.
Id.
Id.at 150.
Id. at 153-54.
360 F. Supp. at 1252.
520 F.2d at 137-38.
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examiner is often the final arbiter on the administrative level, and
here the federal judges are clearly more sensitive to the issues in
discrimination suits. 9 Further, if the court should desire to avail
itself of CSC experience, it may do so through the vehicle of an
amicus curiae brief."0 Thus the' court concluded that no policy considerations implicit in Title VII militated against provision of a trial
de novo.8 '
These issues were not ones of first impression to federal courts.
The issue of trial de novo for federal employees has been alive since
the enaction of EEOA. Generally, there have been two distinct lines
of cases interpreting section 717(c). Prior to the instant case, the
leading case"2 denying trial de novo had been Hackley I.
Two circuits have aligned themselves with Hackley I. In Chandler
v. Johnson,3 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
an employee of the Veteran's Administration who alleged discrimination under Title VII was not entitled to a trial on the merits. 4 The
court approved the trial court's reliance on Hackley I's ruling," and
agreed with it's analysis of section 717's legislative history. 8
7 Here the
The Tenth Circuit spoke in Salone v. United States."
court of appeals held that a federal employee was not entitled to a
de novo hearing in an action brought under section 717.8 The Salone
court also relied on the district court's decision in Hackley I and
suggested that there was a valid distinction between the rights enjoyed by federal and private employees." The court further held
that actions brought under section 717(c) would be governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act. 0
The District of Columbia Circuit might well represent a microcosm of the havoc Hackley II is likely to wreak. In Pointer v.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 155-56.
Id. at 134-35.
515 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 34 (1975).
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 904.
Id. at 903.
Id.
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Sampson, 1 the District Court for the District of Columbia held that
while a trial de novo might be appropriate for employees in the
private sector, the statutory scheme of the EEOA did not make
available the same remedies to federal employees." The Pointer
court cites the broad powers given the CSC as evidence of congressional intent to restrict the judicial function in section 717 cases."
The court concluded that trial de novo after agency and CSC proceedings would be a duplicative effort not consistent with the aims
of EEOA.9 4 Pointer relied heavily upon Hackley I, calling it the
"seminal case" in the area."
Of course, Hackley II obviates the holding of Pointer within the
District of Columbia Circuit, and it can readily be seen that any
future foreign court that rules against federal employees on the trial
de novo issue will have to base its decision on more solid ground
than Hackley I. If there is a trend perceivable throughout the jurisdictions, moreover, it would seem to be in favor of trial de novo.
In Sperling v. United States," plaintiff had been employed by the
U.S. Army Electric Command (ECOM) as a civilian writer. He also
served as Executive Vice President of a local lodge of the American
Federation of Government Employees, in which capacity he served
as grievance representative in Equal Employment Opportunity proceedings at ECOM. In this position he represented a black employee
in several discrimination proceedings. Shortly thereafter, Sperling
was denied promotion. He alleged that this denial was a reprisal for
his successful representation of his fellow employee. 7
The district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment, 8 but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.9 The court concluded, inter alia, that section 717(c)'s grant
of a private right of action requires the district court to conduct a
trial de novo in civil actions filed under the section.'09 The major
factors cited by the court for its decision were the absence of statu91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

62 F.R.D. 689 (D.D.C. 1974).
Id. at 696.
Id. at 694.
Id.
Id. at 695.
515 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1975).
Id. at 467.
7 Empl. Prac. Dec. 7255 (D. N.J. 1974).
515 F.2d 465, 485.
Id. at 484.
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tory restriction of the scope of review, analogy to the rights of private sector employees under EEOA, and legislative history indicating appropriate intent to extend the right of federal employees.','
The court openly questioned Hackley I's construction of the "as
applicable" language in section 717(d),' 0 and opined that it's reliance upon the remarks of Senator Williams was misplaced.
In Caro v. Schultz,' °3 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
expressly approved Sperling,' "4 noting that section 717's legislative
history was at best inconsistent, and that the resultant doubts as
to congressional intent should be resolved in favor of trial de novo.'
Similar developments have occurred in the district courts, and
the previous state of confusion' 0 that existed at that level is beginning to be dispelled. Henderson v. Defense ContractAdministration
Service Region' °7 is a primary example. Here the District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that EEOA mandated a
trial de novo for federal employees.' 8 The court recognized that one
of the primary reasons for the enactment of EEOA was congressional dissatisfaction with CSC procedures.' 0 This being so, the
statute would be construed so as to give effect to its manifest purpose, and the federal employee would receive a trial on the merits."'
Several other district courts have reached a similar result."'
The foregoing cases illustrate a growing tendency of the courts to
hold that a federal employee is guaranteed a trial de novo under
101. Id. at 469-72, 474, 481.
102. Id.at 476.
103. BNA LAB. REL. REP., F.E.P. CAS. (11, at 327) (7th Cir. 1975).
104. Id. at 329.
105. Id.at 330.
106. The split is fairly even. The following have construed § 717(c) as requiring a trial de
novo: Hunt v. Schlesinger, 389 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Tenn. 1974); Griffin v. Postal Serv., 385
F. Supp. 274 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Jackson v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 379 F. Supp. 589 (S.D. Tex.
1973). Compare these cases with the following decisions, all of which held that § 717(c) merely
provided for review of the agency record: Guilday v. Department of Justice, 385 F. Supp. 1096
(D. Del. 1974); Haire v. Calloway, 385 F. Supp. 309 (E.D. Mo. 1974); Ficklin v. Sabatini, 383
F. Supp. 1147 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Cates v. Johnson, 377 F. Supp. 1145 (W.D. Pa. 1974), vacated,
515 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1975); Baca v. Butz, 376 F. Supp. 1005 (D. N.M. 1974); Thompson v.
Department of Justice, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Handy v. Gayler, 364 F. Supp.
676 (D. Md. 1973).
107. 370 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
108. Id.at 184.
109. Id.at 182.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Hunt v. Schlesinger, 389 F. Supp. 725 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
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Title VII. While the opinion in Hackley I held sway for some time,
it now appears that the decision will lose its influence. Circuits yet
to rule on this issue can look to the court of appeals decision, which
methodically disarms the arguments against trial de novo. For the
moment, however, all eyes will be on Chandler v. Johnson, which
was recently granted certiorari"' by the United States Supreme
Court. Whatever that final decision might be, the Court will have
to consider and effectively deal with the issues raised in Hackley v.
Roudebush.
James C. McMahon, Jr.
112.

96 S. Ct. 34 (1975).

